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TRESPASSERS IN THE SKY
By HOwARD H.

HACKLEY*

I. LoRD COKE'S MAXIM

T

HE Supreme Court of the United States recently lost an
excellent opportunity to express its views on a question three
centuries old and yet, oddly enough, a question of considerable
importance to modern aviation.
On February 1, 1937, the Court denied a writ of certiorari in
the case of Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, in which the federal
circuit court of appeals for the ninth circuit had held that the
flight of an airplane as low as five feet above the plaintiff's land
could not be made the basis of an action for trespass in the
absence of actual and substantial damage. Underlying this case was
the fundamental question: Does a landowner have title to the
space above his land and, if so, how much of it?
Three hundred years ago that question was almost entirely
academic. There was no particular reason why a landed gentleman or a small farmer should have been concerned about ownership of the air space above his land. In those days the airplane
was no less fabulous than the phoenix or the unicorn. And yet it
was then that the very eminent Lord Coke was inspired to write:
"The earth hath in law a great extent upwards,.., of ayre and
all other things even
up to heaven; for cujus est solum ejus est
' 2
usque ad coelum.
Had the writer been anyone else, this Latin maxim implying
that the sky is the limit to a landowner's property rights might
have been forgotten; but the writer was Lord Coke and consequently the maxim lived. It was not until the coming of the
*B.A., LL.B., University of Virginia, 1931; LL.M., Columbia University, 1932.
'(C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1936) 84 F. (2d) 755, cert. den. (U.S. 1937) 57 Sup.
Ct. 431.
2Coke, Littleton 4a.
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airplane, however, that it assumed a practical significance; for, if
the sky is indeed the limit, and if a landowner has title to the
space above his land "even up to heaven," then it might well be
argued that an aviator is guilty of a trespass to each and every
bit of privately-owned land over which he chances to fly. Moreover, if such is the law, a landowner might with reason complain
that any legislation on the part of the federal government or of a
state sanctioning air navigation above his land involves an unconstitutional interference with his property rights in violation of the
fifth and fourteenth amendments to the federal constitution.
These were disturbing implications to early aviation lawyers.
Granted that much had happened since Lord Coke's day, still, a
maxim approved by such high authority could not lightly be disregarded. What was more, the courts had even in recent years
' 3
referred to the maxim as stating "an ancient principle of law
'
and "one of the oldest rules of property known to the law." In
1921, the Committee on Aeronautics of the American Bar Association felt that the ad coelum maxim would be a "bugaboo" to the
development of commercial aviation.5 Ten years later, in spite
of the fact that airplanes were darkening the heavens everywhere,
one writer insisted that the ad coelum maxim was "still the law.""
And as late as 1935, a federal court gave expression to the dictum
that "it is a well-settled principle that the owner of property has
control of the air 7space above his property as well as the land
below the surface."

3
Butler v. Frontier Telephone Company, (1906) 186 N. Y. 486, 491,
79 N.4 E. 716.
Hannabalson v. Sessions, (1902) 116 Iowa 457, 90 N. W. 93, 95.
5(1921) 46 A. B. A. Rep. 498. In the same year Major Elza C. Johnson,
the legal advisor to the chief of the air service, expressed the opinion that
a constitutional amendment would be a necessary prerequisite to federal
regulation
of the air. Air Information Circular, Vol. 2, No. 181.
6
H-ise, Ownership and Sovereignty of the Air Space above Landowners'
Premises with Special Reference to Aviation, (1931) 16 Iowa L. Rev.
169, 7194.
United States v. One Pitcairn Biplane, (D.C. N.Y., 1935) 11 F. Supp.
24. The court's statement was clearly not in point, since no question of
private ownership of the air space was involved in this case. An airplane
which had previously been used in smuggling liquor from Canada into
Ohio was seized in New York by the federal customs officials, and an action
for the forfeiture of the plane was brought in the federal district court.
The sole question before the court was the right of a federal court in
New York to entertain this action in view of the fact that the plane had
not landed within that state while transporting the smuggled goods. The
court held that since the plane had flown over the state of New York in
smuggling goods into Ohio, an unlawful act had been committed within the
state of New York. The court's decision was in fact based upon the ground
that the state had sovereignty and jurisdiction over all wrongs committed
in the air space above its territory. State sovereignty of the superincum-
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Apparently, no one now seriously advocates a literal interpretation of Lord Coke's maxim. Even before the airplane, it
was characterized by an English court as "a fanciful phrase" which
had never been law at all." But the exact extent of the maxim's
application under modern conditions, if at all, is far from being
definitely settled. As will be seen, various theories of space ownership have been advanced by writers on the subject. Some of the
courts have taken the position that the flight of an airplane over
private land may constitute a technical trespass, at least at low
altitudes; and they have based their position upon the ground
that a landowner owns the space above his land up to a "reasonable
height."" On the other hand, in the recent Hinman Case,10 the
court refused to find that flight a few feet above the surface constituted a trespass. To add to the confusion, there are statutes
in many states, based on the Uniform State Law for Aeronautics,
which expressly recognize private ownership of space indefinitely
upward, subject, however, to a right of flight in favor of airplanes."
The whole question would probably have been determined long
since if it had not been for the existence of Lord Coke's ambitious
maxim. Although generally discredited, it still rises, like a ghost
from the past, to haunt any discussion of the respective rights of
landowner and aviator. Such being the case, it seems high time
that the maxim should be critically examined in order that its
proper place in the law of aviation may be settled once and for all.
No doubt, maxims have served a useful purpose in our law.
It was Coke himself who wrote that they should be "confessed and
granted without proofe, argument or discourse."' 2 In fact, howbent air space, however, is something entirely different from private
ownership of such space; and, in referring to the ad coelum maxim, the
court was obviously confusing these two different concepts. The case is
discussed in (1935) 20 MINNEsoTA LAW REVIEW 81.
It should be noted that the present study is concerned, not with state
sovereignty in the air space, but with the extent of private ownership
thereof.
xWandworth Board of Works v. United Telephone Company, (1884)
13 Q. B. D. 904. 53 L. J. Q. B. 449.
9Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., (1930) 270 Mass. 511, 170 N. E.
385; Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., (D.C. Ohio 1930) 41 F. (2d)
929, modified in (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1932) 55 F. (2d) 201; Thrasher v. City
of Atlanta, (1934) 178 Ga. 514, 173 S. E. 817.
III(C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1936) 84 F. (2d) 755, cert. den. (U.S. 1937) 57
Sup. Ct. 431.
"The Uniform State Law, further discussed hereafter, is in force in
twenty states.
';Coke, Littleton 67a. Broom, Legal Maxims was prefaced by a motto
stating that "maxims are the condensed Good Sense of Nations;" and in
the preface to Wharton, Legal Maxims, First Am. Ed. 1878, it was asserted
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ever, they have never been more than a convenient means of stating
a complex legal principle. The law itself is not derived from
maxims, but, in accordance with the doctrine of stare decisis, is
derived from, and constituted. by, the actually decided cases.
Accordingly, the extent to which the ad coelum maxim states a
rule of law today must of necessity be determined from a consideration of the holdings of the courts in those cases in which
it has been quoted. Thus, if it was cited in a case which in fact
held only that an entry in the air space ten feet above the surface
of one's land constituted a trespass, that case cannot properly be
regarded as authority for the proposition that an entry in the air
space one thousand feet above the surface would likewise constitute a trespass. Similarly, if a decision in a particular case
did not in fact depend upon a question of ownership or property
rights in space, any reference to the maxim would be in the nature
of dictum only and would not be binding in subsequent cases.
These principles are elementary, but they are of controlling
importance in determining what the ad coelum maxim means
today.
Accordingly, at the risk of repeating what has already been
more ably accomplished by other writers, 13 a consideration of the
question of space ownership with respect to aviation must begin
with a judicial history of Lord Coke's maxim.
that maxims represent the "unerring principles of proof." For an excellent
discussion of maxims generally, see Smith, The Use of Maxims, (1895) 9
Harv. L. Rev. 13.
13
See particularly, Sweeney, Adjusting the Conflicting Interests of
Landowner and Aviator in Anglo-American Law, (1932) 3 J. Air Law
329, 531; Fagg, Airspace Ownership and the Right of Flight, (1932)
3 J. Air Law 400; Kingsley and Maugham, The Correlative Interests
of the Landowner and the Airman, (1932) 3 J. Air Law 374; Bouv6,
Private Ownership of Air Space, (1931) 1 Air L. Rev. 232; Wherry
and Condon, Air Travel and Trespass, (1934) 68 U. S. L. Rev. 78;
Jome, Property in the Air, (1928) 62 Am. L. Rev. 887; Bohlen, Surface Owners and the Right of Flight, (1932) 18 A. B. A. 3. 533; Bouv,
Private Ownership of Navigable Air Space under the Commerce Clause,
(1935) 21 A. B. A. J. 416; Hise, Ownership and Sovereignty of the
Air Space above Landowners' Premises with Special Reference to Aviation,
(1931) 16 Iowa L. Rev. 169, 194; Eubank, The Doctrine of the Air
Space Zone of Effective Possession, (1932) 18 A. B. A. J. 812; Williams,
The Existence of the Right of Flight, (1931) 79 U. Pa. L. Rev. 729; Logan,
The Nature of the Right of Flight, (1930) 1 Air L. Rev. 94; Harriman,
Navigable Air Space and Property Rights, (1930) 1 J. Air L. 346; Eubank,
Who Owns the Airspace? (1929) 63 Am. L. Rev. 1; Bell, Air Rights,
(1929) 23 Ill. L. Rev. 250; Hackett, Rights in Air Space and Lord Ellenborough's Dictum, (1924) 10 Va. L. Rev. 312; Baldwin, The Law of the
Airship, (1910) 4 Am. J. Int. L. 95, 97; (1934) 19 Va. L. Rev. 312; (1933)
5 Air L. Rev. 90; (1931) 2 Air L. Rev. 509; (1931) 15 MINNESOTA LAW
RFvImV 318; (1930)
REVIEW 572.

16 Cornell L. Quar. 119; (1937)

21 MINNESOtA LAW
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II. THE MAXIM IN ENGLISH CASES

While the precise origin of the ad coelum maxim is still shrouded in doubt, it appears to be agreed that its long life began sometime
in the thirteenth century and that its author was an eminent professor of law at the University of Bologna by the name of Accursius. 4 Apparently, the principal occupation of lawyers in Accursius'
day was the writing of glosses or comments on the Roman law;
and in this occupation Accursius was preeminent. In Justinian's
Digest, he ran across a passage written by the Roman Paulus,
which declared with respect to the rights of the owner of a
sepulchre that "coelum quod supra id solum intercedit liberum
esse debet,", or, in other words, that the sky above the sepulchre
"ought to be free." In his annotation to this passage, ,Accursius
coined the ad coelum maxim. Some years later, the English king
Edward I, on his way home from the Holy Lands, persuaded
Franciscus, the son of Accursius, to accompany him to England
Preto lecture on Roman law at the University of Oxford.1
sumably, Franciscus passed the ma.-im on to his pupils, and
eventually it came to the attention of Lord Coke.'"
If this is a true account of the maxim's beginning, three things
are particularly interesting. In the first place, it is to be noted
that it was clearly intended, not as a statement of any property
right in space as such, but merely as a statement of a landowner's
right of freedom from interference in the use and enjoyment of
his land. In the second place, Paulus did not assert that the
sky is free, but that it ought to be free. Finally, it is not at all
certain that Paulus used the term "coelum" in the same sense in
which the word "sky" is used today. One writer has pointed
out that the word was commonly employed by the Romans to
refer to the lower air space, "the area in which the birds fly and
the clouds drift and from which the rain falls and the lightning
strikes ;" and that according to good Latin usage, the "coelum"
was a space which began only a short distance above the surface
7
of the earth.'
"As to the origin of the maxim, see Bouv6, Private Ownership of
Air Space, (1930) 1 Air. L Rev. 232; Spaight, Aircraft in Peace and the
Law 54; Sauze, Les Questions de R~sponsibilit6 en Mati~re d'Aviation
(Paris, 1916) 22.
"GThis conclusion is supported by the reference in Bury v. Pope, (1588)
3 Cro. Eliz. 118, to the maxim as being "Tempus Edw. I."
ViThere appears to be some evidence that the maxim was also used by
another pupil of Accursius by the name of Cino da Pistoria (1270-1336),
who was likewise a glossarist. Miraglia, Comparative Legal Philosophy,
section 292.
17(1928) 62 Am. L. Rev. 894. The uncertainty as to the exact meaning
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Whatever the maxim may have meant to Accursius, it was
first used judicially in Baten's Case,'8 decided by Lord Coke in
1611. In that case, it was actually held only that projecting eaves
from which rain water fell upon the plaintiff's land constituted a
nuisance which might be "prostrated" upon a writ of quod permittat; but, after so holding, Lord Coke declared:
"Also cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum and therewith
agrees 13 H. 8th 1. and by the overbuilding upon part of the
house of the plaintiffs, he has deprived them of the air; also he
has prevented them from building their house higher."
Since the case involved a nuisance and not a question of ownership,
the reference to the maxim was clearly in the nature of dictum.
In any event, the language quoted indicates that Coke regarded
the maxim, not as giving the plaintiffs any ownership of space as
such, but as securing to them the unhindered enjoyment of their
land. 19
The next case in which the maxim appeared was that of Bury
v. Pope,20 which likewise involved a nuisance. The defendant had
erected a building on his land, and the plaintiff brought an action
for damages due to the obstruction of his light. It was held
that the defendant had a right to erect a house on his own land
even though the windows of the plaintiff's house had enjoyed
unobstructed light and air for some thirty or forty years. At the
end of the brief report of the case, the ad coelum maxim was noted
as being of the time of Edward the First; but it could hardly have
been meant to stand for more than that the defendant in this case
had a right to build as high as he pleased on his own land, which
of the word "coelum" is also adverted to in Swetland v. Curtiss Airports

Corp., (D.C. Ohio 1930) 41 F. (2d) 929, 937; and in Thrasher v. City
of Atlanta, (1934) 178 Ga. 514, 173 S. E. 817, 825. In the Thrasher case,
the court queried:
"What is the sky? Who can tell where it begins or define its meaning

in terms of the law? When can it be said that a plane is above the sky or
below it?" One writer suggests that under the Roman law the air space was
public property which an individual might use freely, so long as he did
not produce a nuisance to the surface owner. Bouv6, Private Ownership
of Airspace, (1930) 1 Air. L. Rev. 232, 249. On the other hand, it has

been asserted that the Roman law accorded the surface owner control of
space up to a limited altitude and that such control, within the "spirit"
of the law, could have been extended to any altitude.
Rights in Roman Law, (1931) 2 Air. L. Rev. 455.

Lardone, Airspace

18(1610) 9 Co. Rep. 53b. This decision followed that in Penruddock's

Case, (1598) 5 Co. Rep. 100b, in which it had been held that overhanging
eaves might be abated as a nuisance; but there was no reference in that

case to the ad coelum maxim.
19In the following century, Blackstone in his Commentaries used the
maxim in such a way as to imply a like interpretation. 2 Bl. Comm. 18.
20(1588) 3 Cro. Eliz. 118. .
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is quite another thing from holding that he owned all the air
space above his land.
Not until 1845 was the maxim again cited in an English
opinion. However, Pickering v. Rudd,2 1 in 1815, is extremely
interesting for the language used by Lord Ellenborough in that
case. The defendant, a barber, had constructed a "shew-board,"
or, as we would call it now, a billboard, in order to advertise his
profession. The plaintiff, his neighbor, complained that the board
projected over his land. It eventually appeared that the board
did not in fact so project; but Lord Ellenborough could not resist
commenting that if the board had extended over plaintiff's land,
then it would have presented a "very nice question." He recalled
a case in which he had held that firing a gun into a field was a
breaking of the close or a trespass to the land, but he went on to
say :22

"... I never yet heard that firing in vacuo would be considered
a trespass. No doubt, if you could prove any inconvenience to have
been sustained an action might be maintained; but it would be
questionable whether an action on the case would not be the
proper form. ..."

And then Lord Ellenborough prophetically queried: "Would trespass lie for passing through the air in a balloon over the land of
another?" Apparently, he entertained serious doubt that the
action would be proper. 3
In Fay v. Prentice2 4 in 1845, a cornice of the defendant's
house overhung the adjoining land of the plaintiff; and from this
cornice "divers large quantities of rain water ran, flowed, and
fell" upon the plaintiff's land and thereby "dirtied and spoiled"
the gravel walks of the plaintiff's gardens. The court allowed the
plaintiff to recover damages, but on the theory that the overhanging cornice was a nuisance, not a trespass, to plaintiff's land.
Maule, J., referred to the ad coelum maxim, but only to negative
its application in the case under consideration. He said :25
"....

I agree ... that this declaration does not allege a trespass

and that it was not so intended.
21(1815) 4 Camp. 219, 1 Stark. 56.

The maxim cujus est solum

2"(1815) 4 Camp. 219, 1 Stark. 56.
23Fifty years later, however, in Kenyon v. Hart, (1865) 6 B. & S. 249,
252, Lord Blackburn, obviously with the ad coelum maxim in mind, felt
disposed to agree to the good sense of Lord Ellenborough's doubt, but not
to the "legal reason for it." This case incidentally, held merely that a
statute punishing "trespass in pursuit of game" applied only to live game
and did not apply to an entry upon land in order to retrieve a bird which

had been shot.

24(1845) 1 C. B. 828, 14 L. 3. C. P. 298.
25(1845) 1 C. B. 828, 14 L. J. C.P. 298.
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ejus est usque ad coelum, is not a presumption of law applicable
in all cases; for example, it does not apply to chambers in the inns
of courts. ..."

Dictum likewise was the reference to the maxim in Solomon v.
The Vintners' Company,26 decided in 1859. In that case, there
were three houses built on the side of a hill, of which defendant's
was the lowest and plaintiff's the uppermost. All three houses
leaned out of the perpendicular. The intervening landowner
sought to tear his house down, and as a result the plaintiff's house
toppled over. For some reason, apparently because the intervening landowner had no money, the plaintiff brought action
against the defendant who owned the lowest house. The court
held that, since the plaintiff's house had not adjoined defendant's
house, the defendant owed the plaintiff no right of support. Pollock, C. B., remarked that the leaning building "no doubt occupied
a space belonging to his neighbor, the rule of law being cujus est
solum ejus est uque ad coelum." This statement, however, was
clearly not material to the court's decision, since the defendant's
house certainly did not overhang the plaintiff's land, and the
decision of the court was simply that the defendant owed the
plaintiff no right of support.
There were two cases in 1874 in which the maxim, as cited
by the court, bore a closer relation to the actual decisions than
in the cases so far noted.
The first of these cases was Corbett v. Hill.2 7 The plaintiff
had sold one of two adjacent buildings owned by him to the
defendant with the ground site of the defendant's property carefully marked out in the deed. Later it was found that one of the
rooms in plaintiff's house projected over onto the defendant's site.
By some sort of architectural legerdemain, the defendant built an
addition to his house which in turn overhung the plaintiff's projecting room. Naturally, the plaintiff objected and sought to
enjoin the defendant from continuing the construction of such
addition. The court held that it was an "ordinary rule of law"
that whoever owns the "solum" is the "owner of everything up to
the sky and down to the centre of the earth ;" but that this rule
was only a presumption of law which in this case was successfully
rebutted as to the plaintiff's projecting room by the terms of the
deed itself. Except for such room, however, the court held that
the column of air space above the defendant's land was the
26(1859) 5 H. & N. 585, 28 L. J. Ex. 370.
27(1870) L. R. 9 Eq. 671, 39 L. J. Ch. 547.
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defendant's property and that, therefore, the addition being built
by him, even though it projected above the plaintiff's room, was
a proper exercise of the defendant's rights. Thus, the court
accepted the ad coelum maxim as authority for the defendant's
ownership of the space above his land, at least to the height to
which he intended to build the addition to his house; but the
case can hardly be regarded as holding that the defendant owned
the superincumbent air space above his land indefinitely upward.
23
In the same year, in Ellis v. Loftus Iron Co., the maxim
was again referred to as supporting ownership of space above one's
land, at least up to a certain height. In this case, it appeared that
the defendant was the owner of an "entire horse" and that the
plaintiff, his neighbor, owned several mares. One day it happened
that defendant's "entire horse" kicked and bit one of the plaintiff's
mares through an intervening iron fence that ran along the
boundary line. The plaintiff brought suit against the defendant
in an action on the case for negligence. Apparently, the court
felt that the defendant had not been negligent, since it appeared
that his horse had never bitten or kicked any animal before, but
on the contrary "was as quiet a temper as you would ever wish
a horse." However, the court held that since defendant's horse
must of necessity have extended his mouth and hoof over the
plaintiff's land, a trespass had been committed for which recovery
should be allowed. Reaching this conclusion with evident reluctance, Chief Justice Denman declared :21
"It seems hard where two parties have adjoining land with a
fence between them, and a quarrel arises between the animals on
either side of the fence, one party should be liable for the consequences though not in reality guilty of default or neglect any more
than the other party, by reason of the application to the mere act
of an animal of the technical rule cujus est solum ejus est usque
ad coelum. I must say, however, that I cannot see, upon the
authorities, any escape from the conclusion that it must be so."
Ten years later, in Wandworth Board of Works v. United
Telephone Co., 0 Lord Coke's maxim was very irreverently referred
to as a mere "fanciful phrase ;" but the court could not help conceding that the maxim was part of the common law of England.
In this case the plaintiff had been granted title to a certain street
by an act of Parliament. The defendant company sought to stretch
wires over the street and the plaintiff thereupon asked for an
2 (1874) L. R. 10 C. P. 10, 44 L. J. C. P. 24.
29L. R. 10 C. P. 10, 14, 44 L. J. C. P. 24.

36'(1884) 13 Q. B. D. 904, 53 L. J. Q. B. 449.
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injunction. The court held that, within the meaning of the
statute vesting title in plaintiff to the street in question, the term
"street" carried with it only a reasonable zone of user above and
below the surface, and that, therefore, wires stretched by the
defendant above the street at such a height as not to endanger
traffic below could not properly be enjoined by the plaintiff. In
this connection, the language of the court is particularly interesting:
"I am not about to question that which has been laid down by
Lord Coke in Co. Litt. 4 a, namely, that where a piece of land is
granted or is conveyed in England by a grant from the King or
by a conveyance from party to party, under the word 'land' everything is passed which lies below that portion of land down to what
is called the centre of the earth-which is, of course, a mere fanciful phrase-and usque ad coelum-which to my mind is another
fanciful phrase. By the common law of England the whole of
that is transferred by the grant or the conveyance under the term
'land.' But I am of opinion that it does not follow that in a grant
or conveyance the word 'street' would produce the same result."
Obviously, this case lends little support to a literal interpretation
of the ad coelum maxim, since the court was concerned, not with
the meaning of "land," but with the meaning of the term "street"
as used in the particular statute under consideration.
The latest English case in which the maxim appears to have
been mentioned was Lemmon v. Webb, 31 decided in 1894. In that
case, the branches of a tree standing on the defendant's land overhung the land of the plaintiff. The court admitted that the ad
coelum maxim might apply to overhanging eaves or cornices,
but distinguished overhanging branches on the ground that in the
case of eaves or cornices there is an actual encroachment upon and
occupation of land which may give rise to an action of trespass,
whereas "the owner of a tree which gradually grows over his
neighbor's land is not regarded as insensibly and by slow degrees
acquiring title to the space into which its branches gradually
grow." The real reason, however, why overhanging branches
were excepted from the ad coelum rule seems to have been that
they do not effectually interfere with the landowner's use of his
land, inasmuch as he may always lop off the branches as a nuisance,
31[1894] 3 Ch. 1, 63 L. J. Ch. 570, aff'd [1895] A. C. 1, 64 L. J. Ch.
205. While there have apparently been no subsequent English cases, it is
interesting to note that an English scholar, one Sir H. S. Theobold, K. C.,
has written a book entitled "Law of Land" in which he concludes that:
"The public . . . has the right to navigate the air at a proper height,
and there is no liability for trespass by merely passing over the lands of
others in flight, but there is no right to land on soil of another." See
(1931) 171 Law Times 28.
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a summary procedure not permissible with respect to eaves and
cornices.
Such are the English cases; and it seems hardly necessary to
point out that none of them may properly be regarded as authority
for ownership of space in the vicinity of the stars. It will be noted
that in only one case, that of Ellis v. Loftus Iron Co., was it
specifically held that an intrusion into the space over one's lands
constituted a trespass; and in that case the intrusion was within
a few feet of the surface. In one other case, Corbett v. Hill, the
maxim apparently was interpreted as giving a landowner ownership of space above his land, at least to the height of an addition
to his house. In all of the other cases, however, references to the
maxim were unadulterated dictum, since the actual decisions in
those cases depended, not upon property rights in space, but upon
liability for nuisance.
III. TE

AmERICAN CASES

Apparently, the earliest American decision involving title to
the air space was Lyman v. Hale,3 2 decided in 1836. The plaintiff
had on his land a tree which bore luscious pears. A branch of
this tree overhung defendant's land, and the latter very naturally
appropriated the fruit within his reach. Upon the trial of the
case, the defendant urged that since "land comprehends everything
in a direct line above it," he had a perfect right to remove fruit
from branches overhanging his land. The court "readily admitted"
that such was the "general doctrine," but held that it had no
applicability to the case under consideration. Thus, as in the subsequently decided English case of Lemnon v. Webb, already
referred to, this case regarded the ad coelum maxim as inapplicable
to overhanging branches.
In line with the English cases, the courts in this country have
held that overhanging walls and eaves may be enjoined as
nuisances, and in such cases, of course, the ad coelum maxim, if
mentioned at all, was not the basis of the decision.3 3 A few cases,
however, have apparently regarded the maxim as sufficient authority to support an action for trespass.
In Codman v. Evans,34 although an action for damages resulting from an overhanging wall was held to be in tort for nuisance,
32(1836) 11 Conn. 177.
33
See, for example, Kafka v. Bozio, (1923) 191 Cal. 746, 218 Pac. 653;
Harrington v. McCarthy, (1897) 169 Mass. 492, 48 N. E. 278; Langfeldt v.
McGrath, (1889) 33 I1. App. 158.
34(1863) 89 Mass. 431.
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the court declared that trespass might have been sustained. A
few years later, on the authority of this dictum, the Massachusetts
court decided that projecting eaves constituted a forcible entry
of defendant's close and that trespass quare clausum fregit would
lie for their removal.35 Similarly, a leaning building has been
impliedly recognized as constituting a trespass; 36 and nominal
damages have been allowed for the "technical trespass" committed
by a flashboard which extended one inch over the boundary line.37
While the question of space ownership has generally arisen
in actions for trespass to real property, in several instances it has
also been presented in connection with actions of ejectment.
Thus, in an early New York case, it was held that a leaning wall
gave rise to an action for the recovery of possession of real property; and the court apparently based' its decision on the ad coelum
maxim.38 However, it is significant that the maxim was not interpreted literally, but was regarded merely as a rule for the protection
3
of the use of one's land. In the words of the court in this case,
"Land, it need hardly be said, extends upward as well as
downward as far as the convenience of the subjacent soil may see
fit to extend it." (Italics supplied.)
This decision was subsequently overruled by the case of Aiken v.
Benedict,40 in which it was held that an action for a nuisance, and
not ejectment, was the proper remedy against projecting eaves.
However, this case was in turn overruled in 1906 by Butler v.
Frontier Telephone Co., 41 in which the ad coelum maxim was
specifically made the basis for sustaining an action of ejectment to
enforce the removal of wires which had been stretched by the
defendant telephone company over the premises of the plaintiff.
Treating the maxim as an "ancient principle of law," the court
declared :42
"... The surface of the ground is a guide but not the full
measure; for within reasonable limitations land includes not only
the surface, but also the space above and the part beneath ...
'Usque ad coelum' is the upper boundary, and, while this may not
be taken literally, there is no limitation within the bounds of any
structure yet erected by man. So far as the case before us is
35
Smith
36

v. Smith, (1872) 110 Mass. 302.
Crocker v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., (1901) 61 App. Div. 226, 70
N. Y.
37 S. 492.
Puorto v. Chieppa, (1905) 78 Conn. 401, 62 Atl. 664.
38
Sherry v. Frecking, (1855) 4 Duer. (N.Y.) 452.
39(1855) 4 Duer. (N.Y.) 452, 457.
40(1863) 39 Barb. (N.Y.) 400.
41(1906) 186 N. Y. 486, 78 N. E. 716.
42(1906) 186 N. Y. 486, 78 N. E. 716, 718.
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concerned, the plaintiff as the owner of the soil owned upward
to an indefinite extent. .

.

. According to fundamental principles

and within the limitation mentioned, space above land is real
estate the same as the land itself. [Sic] The law regards the
empty space as if it were a solid, inseparable from the soil, and
protects it from hostile occupation accordingly. ..."
While the court thus emphatically approved the maxim, it is to be
noted that it was intimated that the maxim should not be taken as
a premise for absolute ownership of all the superincumbent air
space, but rather as a safeguard upon the landowner's right to
build. Thus, at a later point in its opinion, the court said :43
"... The smallness of the wire in question does not affect the
controlling principle, for it was large enough to prevent the plaintiff
from building to a reasonable height upon his lot."
One of the most interesting cases in which the maxim has been
cited was that of Hannabalsonv. Sessions, 44 decided by the Iowa
supreme court in 1902. Plaintiff and defendant were neighbors
but, it appears, not particularly friendly ones. One day, the defendant, while at work in his garden, was interrupted by a brick
thrown in his direction by one of plaintiff's children, and, "in his
indignation at the unprovoked bombardment," defendant threatened the lad with arrest. Plaintiff and her husband heard the
threat and a quarrel ensued. In the course of the battle, the plaintiff rather belligerently extended her arm over the fence and the
defendant, according to his own story, "laid his open hand upon
plaintiff's arm and mildly but firmly suggested the propriety of
her 'keeping on her own side of the fence.'" Some weeks later
the plaintiff instituted an action for assault. The court held for
the defendant on the ground that in repelling plaintiff's arm, he
was acting in justifiable defense of his property. In this connection, the court said :
"... The mere fact that plaintiff did not step across the boundary line does not make her any less a trespasser if she reached her
arm across the line, as she admits she did. It is one of the oldest
rules of property known to the law that the title of the owner of the
soil extends not only downward to the centre of the earth, but
upward usque ad coelum, although it is, perhaps, doubtful whether
owners as quarrelsome as the parties in this case will ever enjoy
the usufruct of their property in the latter direction. ..."
This case, therefore, clearly supports the proposition that an
intrusion into space above one's land at a point near the surface
constitutes a technical trespass.
43(1906) 186 N. Y. 486, 78 N. E. 716, 718.
44(1902) 116 Iowa 457, 90 N. W. 93.
45(1902) 116 Iowa 457, 90 N. W. 93, 95.
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The firing of bullets over a person's land has likewise been
regarded as a trespass. In Whittaker v. Stanvick," the defendant,
while duck hunting, fired over the plaintiff's land. Apparently, the
shooting did no harm, and defendant relied upon the defense that
the law takes no concern with trifles. The court, however, refused
to recognize this defense, on the ground that such a contention involved a misapprehension of the law of trespass. It was pointed
out that in trespass on the case damages directly resulting therefrom must be shown, but that in trespass to real property "it is immaterial whether the quantum of harm suffered be great, little, or
unappreciable. '4 7 Accordingly, the court held that the shooting
constituted a technical trespass and, therefore, granted the plaintiff's request for an injunction.
The facts and the holding of the court were somewhat similar
in Herrin v. Sutherland,4 where it appeared that the defendant
had fired a shotgun over the plaintiff's premises. On the theory
that the air space "at least near the ground is almost as inviolable
as the soil itself," the court held that the plaintiff had committed
a technical trespass.
In 1922, the Supreme Court of the United States, without
mentioning the ad coelum maxim, gave its support to private ownership of space near the surface of the land. In Portsniouth
HarborLand and Hotel Company v. United States,49 the plaintiff,
who owned a summer resort, alleged that shots had been fired over
his property from a nearby government fort and that, as a result,
his guests had been frightened away. In the circumstances, plaintiff charged that a servitude had been imposed upon his land for
which he had a claim. In sustaining the plaintiff's contention, Mr.
Justice Holmes, speaking for the court, remarked that the shots
fired over plaintiff's land were "successive trespasses" which supported evidence of an intent to "take" the plaintiff's property.
Ordinarily, as has been seen, the question of property rights
in the air space results from the entry or presence of objects above
one's land. In at least one case, however, the question has arisen
in the application of principles of constitutional law. In Piper v.
Ekern,"0 the Wisconsin court, in 1923, held that a statute which
prohibited the erection of buildings in a certain part of a city at a
46(1907) 100 Minn. 386, 111 N. "A'. 295.
47In startling contrast is the holding of the court in the recent Hinman
Case, post note 73.
48(1928) 74 Mont. 387, 241 Pac. 328.
49(1922) 260 U. S. 327, 43 Sup. Ct. 135, 67 L. Ed. 287.
50(1923) 180 Wis. 586, 194 N. W. 159.

TRESPASSERS IN THE SKY

height exceeding ninety feet could not be regarded as a reasonable
exercise of the state's police power and was, therefore, an unconstitutional taking of private property without compensation. In
support of its conclusion, the court said :"'
"The owner's right in property when unrestricted extends not
only downward under the surface to an unlimited extent, but
also upwards, and the latter right, from common experience, would
appear to be the more valuable ......
Thus, the ad coelum maxim, though not expressly quoted, was
here applied, not merely as protecting a landowner against trespasses by his neighbors, but as protecting him against interference
by the state with his property rights; but it is to be noted that the
underlying principle in this case, as in other cases already considered, was not the ownership of space for its own sake but the
protection of the owner of the surface in his right to build thereon as high as he might please.
Before concluding this discussion of the cases, it may be noted
that the ad coelum maxim has been applied by the courts in supporting ownership beneath, as well as above, the surface of the
land. Cases of this description, while not directly affecting the
question of ownership of the air space, are interesting as indicating
how the courts, even in recent years, have been inclined to cite
the maxim without apparently appreciating the absurdity of its
literal application.
For example, in 1922, the Montana court12 held that a state

statute prohibiting the burning of natural gas from natural gas
wells under certain circumstances was an unconstitutional taking
of property below the surface of the land without due process of
law; and the court cited the ad coelum maxim as stating the "common law" rule in Montana. In the same year, a federal court,
in a case involving the right of the state to authorize the condemnation of rights of way through a seam of coal under the
surface of the land, declared that the term "land" includes "all interest in the land or that lies above or below it."" And, as recently
as 1929, the Indiana court of appeals declared :54
"The general rule that whatever lies beneath the surface of a
tract of land belongs to the owner of the surface is so familiar that
it should be unnecessary to cite authority to sustain it. ..."
In one rather interesting case," a controversy with respect to
51(1923)
180 Wis. 586, 194 N. W. 159, 161.
52 Gas Products Co. v. Rankin, (1922) 63 Mont. 372, 207 Pac. 993.
Coal Co. v. Mudd, (D.C. Ala. 1922) 281 Fed. 183.
-3Garnsey
"4Risley v. Rumble, (1924) 81 Ind. App. 573, 144 N. E. 568, 571, 573.
FEdwards v. Sims, (1929) 232 Ky. 791, 24 S. W. (2d) 619. Litigation
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the ownership of a cave was decided on the basis of that part of
the maxim which purports to give a landowner title "to the depths."
A man named Edwards had discovered and developed a cave in
Kentucky, and had profited thereby to such an extent that his
neighbor, one Lee, charged that the cave might extend under his
land. He, therefore, requested the court for an order directing
a survey of the cave to determine whether this was true. The trial
court granted Lee's request, and Edwards sought a writ of prohibition against the judge of the court for the purpose of stopping
the survey. The court of appeals, however, denied the writ
on the ground that, because of the ad coelum maxim, Lee owned
all beneath the surface of his land and, therefore, had a right to
have the survey made in order to determine whether the cave in
question in fact extended under his land. Intimating that it held
the maxim in high regard, the court said :51
"Cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum ad infernos (to
whomsoever the soil belongs, he owns also to the sky and to the
depths), is an old maxim and ride. It is that the owner of realty,
unless there has been a division of the estate, is entitled to the free
and unfettered control of his own land above, upon, and beneath
the surface. So whatever is within a direct line between the surface of the land and the centre of the earth belongs to the owner of
the surface. . .

."

(Italics supplied.)

One of the justices in this case, more modern-minded than the
majority, wrote a blistering dissenting opinion, in which he conceded that the space above and below the surface of one's land
should be subject to the dominion of the owner of the surface in so
far as the use of that space is necessary for his proper enjoyment
of the surface, but refused to admit that a landowner has any
further right in such space different from that of the public at
large 5 7
in this case, on the question of damages, dragged on for seven years. See
Edwards v. Lee, (1933) 250 Ky. 166, 61 S. W. (2d) 1049; (1936) 96
S. W. (2d) 1028. See comment in (1937) 37 Col. L. Rev. 503.
56(1929) 232 Ky. 791, 24 S. W. (2d) 619, 620.
57
1n the course of his dissenting opinion, Justice Logan said, (1929)
232 Ky. 791, 24 S.W. (2d) 619, 622:
"It sounds well in the majority opinion to tritely say that he who owns
the surface of real estate without reservation owns from the centre of the
earth to the outmost sentinel of the solar system. The age-old statement
adhered to in the majority opinion as the law, in truth and fact, is not
true now and never has been .....
"... The old sophistry that the owner of the surface of land is the
owner of everything from zenith to nadir must be reformed and the reason
why its reformation is necessary is because the theory was never true in
the past, but no occasion arose that required the testing of it. Mlan had
no dominion over the air until recently, and, prior to his conquering the
air, no one had any occasion to question the claim of the surface owner that
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Even as recently as 1936, the maxim was cited with apparent
approval in a case involving ownership of the subsurface. In
Jones v. Vermont Asbestos Corp.,58 the validity of a statute authorizing the state university to convey certain land to a private corporation was sustained. It appeared, however, that the original
grant of the land by the state to the university had specifically
excepted all gold and silver mines which might be discovered
under the surface; and, accordingly, the court held that, while the
statute authorizing the conveyance of the land was valid, the
conveyance could not operate to convey title to any gold or
silver which might subsequently be found beneath the surface.
With this exception, the court described the title of the private
corporation to which the land was conveyed as follows :"
"The Vermont Asbestos Corporation, as the possessor of the
surface of the soil, will be deemed to be in possession of whatever
lies underneath the surface, since land includes not only the ground
or soil, but everything attached to it above or below, in accordance
with the maxim 'cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum.'"
Apparently, the judge was not a Latin scholar, for, while ownership of the subsurface was the question at issue, he quoted only
that part of the maxim which relates to ownership above the surface. It is significant, moreover, that the court did not interpret
the maxim literally as giving ownership to everything above or
below the surface, but instead asserted that it gave title only to
everything "attached" to the surface above or below.
The cases heretofore considered represent the principal cases,
English and American, not involving the flight of airplanes, in
which the ad coelum maxim has been referred to or applied. While,
as has been seen, the language of the maxim appears to hold an
irresistible attraction for the courts, two things stand out as imthe air above him was subject to his dominion. Naturally, the air above
him should be subject to his dominion in so far as the use of the space is
necessary for his proper enjoyment of the surface, but further than that
he has no right in it separate from that of the public at large. The true
principle should be announced to the effect that a man who owns the surface,
without reservation owns not only the land itself, but everything upon, above,
or under it, which he may use for his profit or pleasure, and which he may
subject to his dominion and control. But further than this his ownership
cannot extend. It should not be held that he owns that which he cannot
use and which is of no benefit to him, and which may be of benefit to
others.
"Shall a man be allowed to stop airplanes flying above his land because
he owns the surface? He cannot subject the atmosphere through which
they fly to his profit or pleasure; therefore, so long as airplanes do not
injure him, or interfere with the use of his property, he should be helpless
to prevent their flying above his dominion ..
oS(Vt. 1936) 182 Atl. 291.
rD(Vt. 1936) 182 AtI. 291, 303.
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portant in so far as aviation is concerned. In the first place,
wherever the maxim has been construed or explained, it has generally been regarded as a rule for the full enjoyment of one's land
and not as a rule for the ownership of space as such. Secondly,
in no case has the actual decision been that private ownership of
space exists at a high altitude above the surface such as that usually flown by airplanes, no matter how broad and sweeping may have
been the court's language.
It must be admitted that some of the cases logically support
the conclusion that an entry by an airplane into the space near the
surface of one's land might constitute at least a technical trespass.
On the other hand, it may safely be said that there is nothing in
our common law, the maxim to the contrary notwithstanding, which
would render all airplane flight a trespass to the underlying land.
Where, then, should the line be drawn? What, exactly are the
circumstances under which an aviator should be regarded as a
trespasser? Or should the idea of trespass to space above land
be discarded entirely?

IV. THE AIRPLANE CASES
The first case in which an aviator was brought face to face
with the implications of the ad coelum maxim was that of Commonwealth v. Nevin,6 ° decided in 1922; and in that case the aviator
came out victorious. He was prosecuted for low flying under a
state statute which forbade "wilful entry upon land ;" but he was
acquitted on the ground that the statute in question applied only
to such things "as were, and always had been, trespasses to land"
and that flying an airplane was not in that category. Noteworthy
is the fact that the plane here was flying as low as fifty feet, while
in later cases, as will be seen, aviators were to be held guilty of
trespass even though flying at much greater altitudes.
In the following year, the maxim was invoked in a Minnesota
case as ground for an injunction against all flying over the plaintiff's property. 61 The court refused to accept such a literal interpretation of the maxim, and granted the injunction only against
flight under two thousand feet, which happened to be the minimum
altitude at which airplanes could lawfully fly under Minnesota law.
The court was of the opinion that the upper air space was a
60(Ct. of
Rep. 241, 1928
61Johnson
1923) 1928 U.

Q. Sess., Jefferson Co., Penn. 1928) 2 Pa. Dist. & Co.
U. S. Av. Rep. 39.
v. Curtis Northwest Airplane Co., (D.C. Ramsey Co., Minn.
S. Av. Rep. 42.
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.,natural heritage common to all the people," that its use should not
be hampered by an "ancient artificial maxim," and that any idea
of trespass above two thousand feet was a mere "legal fiction."
These two comparatively early cases, although decided by
lower courts, seemed to indicate that aviation would have little to
fear from the application of Lord Coke's maxim.C2 It was not
until 1930, however, that the meaning of the maxim with reference to the flight of airplanes received serious consideration. In
that year, the highest court of Massachusetts and a federal district
court in Ohio were each petitioned by a landowner for an injunction against the flight of airplanes over the plaintiff's land.
In the Massachusetts case, Smith v. New England Aircraft
Co.,3 the plaintiff contended that the flying of airplanes from an
adjacent airport over his land was both a trespass and a nuisance.
The ad coelum maxim was cited as supporting a landowner's right
to the usable air space above his land, but the plaintiff stated that
it was not his purpose to base his case upon this maxim. The
court agreed that for the purposes of the decision, private ownership of air space extended "to all reasonable heights above the
underlying land ;" but it was of the opinion that the state and federal minimum altitude rules then in force operated to legalize any
flights above the prescribed minimum altitude (in both cases five
hundred feet), and that such altitude rules, if they interfered at all
with the plaintiff's property, were, as to the state, a valid exercise
of its police power, and, as to the federal government, a proper
exercise of its power to regulate interstate commerce. Accordingly, without deciding whether the landowner had title to the space
above the minimum altitude at which airplanes might lawfully fly,
the court refused to grant an injunction against flying above that
height. However, with respect to flights as low as one hundred
feet above the surface of plaintiff's land, the court held that such
flights were not authorized by the minimum altitude rules, and
that "under settled principles of law" they constituted a trespass to
plaintiff's land. Nevertheless, since it was not shown that any
5

2In this connection also, it may be noted that in 1923 the Comptroller

General of the United States denied a claim for damages where the plain-

tiff's cattle had been frightened into a stampede by low flying army
planes; and in holding that the Government could not be held liable
the mere flying over the plaintiff's land, the Comptroller General
phasized the fact that there had been no actual physical contact. 3

airfor
em-

Op.
Comp. Gen. 234; 1928 U. S. Av. Rep. 46.
'iJ(1930) 270 Mass. 511, 170 N. E. 385. For comments on this case,
see (1930) 1 J. Air Law 367; (1930) 16 Va. L. Rev. 714; (1931) 29
Mich. L. Rev. 242; (1930) 30 Col. L. Rev. 579; (1930) 78 Univ. Pa. L.
Rev. 902; (1930) 1 Air L. Rev. 420.
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substantial damage resulted, the court held that even flights at
this altitude did not justify the granting of an injunction.
In Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 4 unlike the Smith Case,
the plaintiffs "relied strongly" on the ad coelum maxim. Accordingly, the federal district court, in a scholarly opinion, reviewed the maxim's history at great length. As the result of its
survey of the authorities, the court concluded :05
"... It is safe to say that there are no cases which involve an
adjudication of property rights as appurtenant to land in the air
space which would be normally used by an aviator. It is true that
in many of them the maxim is quoted and, seemingly, is used by
the courts as a basis for their decisions; but it is the point actually
decided in the cases, not the maxim, which established the law. In
other words, it can be said that the maxim is the law only to the
extent that it has been applied in the adjudicated cases. Maxims
are but attempted general statements of rules of law. The judicial
process is the continuous effort on the part of the courts to state
actively these general rules, with their proper and necessary limitations and exceptions....
"It appears from these authorities that the maxim has never
been applied in cases which fix rights in air space normally
traversed by the aviator. There are no precedents or decisions
which establish rules of property as to such air space. . ....
As in the Smith Case, the court felt that the minimum altitude
rules did not deny the plaintiffs "effective possession" of their
property, or amount to an unlawful taking of their property without due process of law. Accordingly, the court refused to grant
an injunction against flights over the plaintiffs' land at heights
above five hundred feet, the altitude fixed by the minimum altitude
rules. Below that altitude, however, it was held that the minimum
altitude rules did not apply, and that the rights of the plaintiffs,
if unreasonably interfered with, should be protected by the application of the rule of "effective possession." Accordingly, the
court concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to an injunction
restraining the defendant from "avigating over the property of
plaintiffs or any part thereof unless at altitudes of 500 feet or in
excess thereof."
Swetland, not satisfied with an injunction prohibiting only
flights at less than five hundred feet, took an appeal to the circuit
court of appeals. Since the trial in the lower court, the airport
64(D.C. Ohio 1930) 41 F. (2d) 929. For comments on this case, see
(1930) 40 Yale L. J. 131; (1930) 17 Va. L. Rev. 77; (1930) 30 Col. L.
Rev. 1213; (1930) 1 Air L. Rev. 272; (1930)
6 Wis. L.Rev. 47.
65
(D.C. Ohio 1930) 41 F. (2d) 929, 936.

1 Air L. Rev. 489; (1930)
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had been more fully developed and, as a result, it had become even
more obnoxious to the plaintiff. On this ground, the circuit
court of appeals modified the decree of the district court, and held
that the airport had become a nuisance, and that its operation
should be entirely enjoined.6" With respect to the ad coelum
maxim, the court refused to adopt the view which had been expressed in the district court-that is, that the early cases in which
the maxim had been cited were decided upon the theory of nuisance
rather than trespass. On the contrary, the circuit court of appeals
seemed to feel that the maxim, so far as it affects aviation, should
be entirely disregarded. In this connection, it was stated :67
"In every case in which it is to be found, it was used in connection with occurrences, common to the era, such as overhanging
branches or eaves. These decisions are relied upon to define the
rights of the new and rapidly-growing business of aviation. This
can not be done consistently with the traditional policy of the
courts to adapt the law to the economic and social needs of the
times. ..

."

Accordingly, it was the appellate court's opinion that the question should be considered in relation to the necessities of the period
and that, from this point of view, it could not be held that in every
case it is a trespass against the owner of the soil to fly an airplane
through the air space overlying the surface. However, notwithstanding its somewhat different attitude toward the application of
the maxim, the court apparently adopted the rule of "effective
possession" which had been announced by the district court. In
accordance with this rule, the circuit court of appeals took the position that the landowner has "a dominant right of occupancy" for
purposes incident to his use and enjoyment of the surface, and that
there may be such a continuous and permanent use of the lower
stratum of air space as to impose "a servitude upon his use and
enjoyment of the surface." On the other hand, with respect to
the "upper stratum," which the landowner may not reasonably expect to occupy, the court felt that he has no rights, except to prevent the use of it by others to the extent of an unreasonable interference with his complete enjoyment of the surface, and that in
such event his remedy is an action for -nuisance and not trespass.
In line with the Swetland Case, it was decided a few years
later, in a case arising in New York, that an aviator whose plane
crashed into the top of a tower on the plaintiff's land was guilty
66Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1932) 55 F.
(2d) 201.
,37(C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1932) 55 F. (2d) 201, 203.
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of a trespass. 68 In this case, the court based its decision on the
theory that a landowner possesses exclusive rights to the space
above his land, at least to such heights as he may build. With
reference to the question of trespass to air space, the court said :"9
"....

What is, or is to be, the law regarding the ancient maxim

'cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum?' Not to go beyond the
necessities of this case, it may be confidently stated that, if that
maxim ever meant that the owner of land owned the space above
the land to an indefinite height, it is no longer the law....
"It is plain, however, that outside of the sovereign police power,
no rule has been or will be made, which abridges the exclusive
right of the owner of land to the space above it, to such height as
he may build a structure upon the land; therefore, for the purpose
of this case, it may be assumed that, when the airplane came in
contact with the top of this tower, the rights and responsibilities
of the respective parties were exactly the same as they would have
been had the airplane come in contact with the earth below. ..."
In Thrasher v. City of Atlanta7 decided in 1934, the maxim
was again invoked by a landowner near Atlanta, as ground for an
injunction against the low flying of airplanes over his land. But
the plaintiff in this case apparently realized that, in the light of
the Smith and Swetland Cas-es, it would be difficult for him to
obtain an injunction against flights over his land above the lawful
minimum altitudes of flight. Accordingly, he sought an injunction
only against "low flying" over his property under an altitude of
five hundred feet. The court held, however, that the plaintiff had
failed to show a trespass even as to flights below that altitude. With
reference to the plaintiff's allegation that pilots had flown over his
property at altitudes lower than five hundred feet, the court pointed
out that, properly construed, this allegation stated an altitude of
only a little less than five hundred feet, and that such an allegation,
without a further statement of the exact altitude or other circumstances, could not establish a trespass.
It is interesting to note that in this case the plaintiff relied
upon a state statute which provided that "the right of the owner
of lands extends downward and upward indefinitely." Recognizing that this statute was based upon the ad coelum maxim, the court
without hesitation declared that since that maxim was largely
obiter dictum and could not be taken as an authentic statement of
any law, the literal terms of the statute in question should be discounted and qualified. In this connection, the court stated :71
68

Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation v. Dunlop, (1933)
Misc. Rep. 149, 266 N. Y. S. 469.
69(1933) 148 Misc. Rep. 149, 266 N. Y. S. 469, 471, 472.
70(1934) 178 Ga. 514, 173 S. E. 817.
71(1934) 178 Ga. 514, 173 S. E. 817, 825.
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"... The maxim to which reference has been made is a generalization from old cases involving the title to space within the range
of actual occupation, and any statement as to title beyond was
manifestly a mere dictum. For instance, a court in dealing with the
title to space at a given distance above the earth could make no
authoritative decision as to the title at higher altitudes, the latter
question not being involved. The common law cases from which
the ad coelum doctrine emanated were limited to facts and conditions close to earth and did not require an adjudication on the title
to the mansions in the sky. ..."
In this case, as in the Swetland Case, the landowner's property
rights in the space above his land were made subject to the rule of
"effective possession;" and particular emphasis was placed upon
the necessity for an exercise of dominion as an element of owner72
ship. In the language of the court,
"... The space in the far distance above the earth is in actual
possession of no one, and, being incapable of such possession, title
to the land beneath does not necessarily include title to such space.
The legal title can hardly extend above an altitude representing the
reasonable possibility of man's occupation and dominion, although
as respects the realms beyond this, the" owner of the land may
complain of any use tending to diminish the free enjoyment of
the soil beneath....
"But the space is up there, and the owner of the land has the
first claim upon it. If another should capture and possess it, as by
erecting a high building with a fixed overhanging structure, this
alone will show that the space affected is capable of being possessed
and consequently the owner of the soil, beneath the overhanging
structure may be entitled to ejectment or to an action for trespass.
However, the pilot of an airplane does not seize and hold the space
or stratum of air through which he navigates, and cannot do so.
He is merely a transient, and the use to which he applies the ethereal
realm does not partake of the nature of occupation in the sense of
dominion and ownership. So long as the space through which he
moves is beyond the reasonable possibility of possession by the
occupants below, he is in free territory, not as every or any man's
land, but rather as a sort of 'no man's land'...."
Thus, it was the court's view that in order for a landowner to
show a trespass by an airplane to the space above his land, he must
show that the plane's flight came within that part of the air space
above his land which, under the circumstances, he might reasonably
occupy. On this theory, therefore, the plaintiff, by merely alleging
flights under five hundred feet, was held not to have established
a trespass to his property.
Finally, there was the Hinmnan Case,7 3 decided by the federal
72(1934) 178 Ga. 514, 173 S. E. 817.
73(C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1936) 84 F. (2d) 755, 758 cert. den. (1937) 57 Sup.
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circuit court of appeals for the ninth circuit in July, 1936. This
case is noteworthy, not only because it represents the latest judicial
condemnation of the ad coelum maxim, but because the court, notwithstanding the cases just discussed, did not recognize the landowner's ownership of air space even up to the height of effective
possession or possible occupation. Moreover, the case is particularly important because, as already noted, a writ of certiorari
taken to the Supreme Court of the United States was denied.
The plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and in possession of certain real property in the city of Burbank, California,
"together with a stratum of air-space superjacent to and overlying
said tracts ... and extending upwards to such an altitude as plaintiffs . . . may reasonably expect now or hereafter to utilize, use,

or occupy said air-space." They further alleged that they might
reasonably expect to utilize, use and occupy such air space to an
altitude of not less than one hundred and fifty feet above the
surface of the land, and that therefore the flight of airplanes operated by the defendant corporations at altitudes less than one hundred feet above the surface were trespasses to the air space for
which damages were asked.
At the outset, the circuit court of appeals refused to accept
a literal construction of the ad coelum doctrine on the ground that
that doctrine was not the law and had never been the law. On the
contrary, the court asserted that title to the air space, unconnected
with the use of the land, is inconceivable. The court then proceeded
to consider the plaintiffs' contention that they might reasonably
expect "now or hereafter" to use or occupy the air space above their
land. After pointing out that the very essence and origin of the
legal right of property is dominion over it, and that without possession it cannot be maintained, the court concluded :74
"We own so much of the space above the ground as we can
occupy or make use of, in connection with the enjoyment of our
land. This right is not fixed. It varies with our varying needs
and is coextensive with them. The owner of land owns as much
of the space above him as he uses, but only so long as he uses it.
All that lies beyond belongs to the world."
On this theory, it was held that, since plaintiffs had not alleged
actual and substantial damage to the use of their lands, they had
not established a trespass for which damages might be recovered,
Ct. 431. For comments on this case, see (1936) 7 J. Air Law 450, 462;
(1936) 7 J. Air Law 624; (1936) 25 Geo. L. J. 196; (1936) 15 Tex. L.
Rev. 146; (1936) 7 Air L. Rev. 445.
74(C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1936) 84 F. (2d) 755, 758 cert. den. (1937) 57
Sup. Ct. 431.
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even though it appeared that defendants' airplanes had glided
through the air within a distance of less than one hundred feet of
the surface of plaintiffs' land or even to a distance of within
five feet of the surface at one end of the property. Then, in
language which would undoubtedly have startled Lord Coke, and
which will probably surprise even more modern students of the
law of real property, the court announced the revolutionary doctrine that there can be no trespass to air space in the absence of
actual damage. In the language of the court :7
"The case differs from the usual case of enjoining a trespass.
Ordinarily, if a trespass is committed upon land, the plaintiff is
entitled to at least nominal damages without proving or alleging
any actual damage. In the instant case, traversing the air space
above appellants' land is not, of itself, a trespass at all, but it is a
lawful act unless it is done under circumstances which will cause
injury to appellants' possession."
In the Swetland Case, flights under five hundred feet were
regarded as trespasses on the theory of "effective possession." On
the similar theory of "reasonable occupation," the court in the
Thrasher Case would clearly have permitted the plaintiff in that
case to recover on the ground of trespass for flights at low altitudes, if the plaintiff had been more specific in alleging the circumstances and the particular altitudes at which the planes had
flown over his land. In neither of these cases, apparently, did the
court feel that a showing of actual and substantial damage was
necessary to sustain the action of trespass. The Hinnian Case,
however, seems not to recognize any theories of effective or possible possession as ground for sustaining an action for trespass to
the air space, but, on the contrary, appears to stand for the proposition that there can be no such trespass unless actual and substantial
damage results to the actual use and enjoyment of the surface.
V.

PRESENT THEORIES

OF SPACE OWNERSHIP

Whatever the courts may have said in horse-and-buggy days
to the effect that a landowner has title to the space above his land
up to the sky, it may now safely be asserted, in the light of recent
cases, that the owner of the surface of land does not have unqualified title to the air space above his property. The time has certainly arrived when the ad coelum maxim should no longer be
repeated or cited in our jurisprudence, at least with respect to
75(C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1936) 84 F. (2d) 755, 758 cert. den. (1937) 57
Sup. Ct. 431.
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the rights of landowners against those who utilize the ether as a
means of travel.
But the rights of the landowner in the space above his land
cannot be entirely forgotten. What are those rights? If he does
not in fact own all the space above his land, how much, if any,
does he own? At least four different views, not counting the strict
"ad coelum" view, have been advanced in an effort to solve the
problem.
Most popular of these views is that characterized as the "zone"
or "effective possession" view,7 which would give the surface
owner only so much of the space above him as is essential to the
complete use and enjoyment of his land. While this view is
essentially in accord with the spirit of the ad coelum maxim
as it has been interpreted by the courts, it is subject to the practical difficulty of determining just what effective possession is and
how far it extends in a particular case. Neither the Smith Case
nor the Swetland Case attempted any very accurate definition of
the term "effective possession," although they intimated that the
meaning of the term would depend in each case upon the facts
involved-that is, the purpose for which the surface of the land
76This view, as has been seen, was suggested in the Smith Case, (1930)
270 Mass. 511, 170 N. E. 385, 393. Likewise, in the Swetland Case, the
federal district court said, (D.C. Ohio 1930) 41 F. (2d) 929, 942:
. . . Until the progress of aerial navigation has reached a point of
development where airplanes can readily reach an altitude of 500 feet
before crossing the property of an adjoining owner, where such crossing
involves an unreasonable interference with property rights or with effcctive
possessions, owners of airports must acquire landing fields of sufficient area
to accomplish that result.
"Whether property rights or effective possession is interfered with
unreasonably is a question of fact in the particular case." (Italics ours.)
The "effective possession" theory has found support among eminent
writers on the law of torts. Thus, Sir Frederick Pollock, in his work on
Torts, 13th ed., p. 362, says:
"It does not seem possible on the principles of the common law to
assign any reason why an entry above the surface should not also be a
trespass, unless indeed it can be said that the scope of possible trespass is
limited by that of possible effective .possession, which might be the most
reasonable rule. ..."

Similarly, Professor Burdick, in his Law of Torts, 4th ed., p. 406,
concludes :
"So, it is submitted, throwing or firing a missile, or sending a balloon
or driving an airplane through the air, over the land of another sufficiently
low to invade that space which the owner of the soil may effectively
possess, amounts to a legal breaking of his close. .. ."
For other treatises in which this view has been advanced, see Kingsley
& Maugham, The Correlative Interests of the Landowner and the Airman,
(1932) 3 J. Air Law 374; Eubank, The Doctrine of the Airspace Zone
of Effective Possession, (1932) 18 A. B. A. J. 812; Bouv6, Private Ownership of Air Space, (1931) 1 Air Law Rev. 232; (1930) 16 Cornell L. Q.
119; Zollman, Law of the Air 14.
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is being used or may be used. Obviously, this means that an
aviator may commit a trespass while flying over A's land but
may not be guilty of a trespass when flying over B's land at the
same altitude. In the Smith Case, flights as low as one hundred
feet were expressly held to be trespasses, since the land happened
to be used for the cultivation of spruce and pine trees which were
known to attain a growth of one hundred feet or more. In the
Swetland Case, the district court enjoined flights at any altitudes
less than five hundred feet. Yet, in the Thrasher Case, flights
below five hundred feet were held not to constitute a trespass, in
the absence of specific allegations as to the height at which planes
had actually flown and as to "'Other circumstances."
A simple solution of the practical difficulty inherent in the
"effective possession" view would be to regard the state and
federal minimum altitude rules as a legislative determination of
the reasonable extent of the landowner's ownership of the space
above his land; and it has been seen that those rules were an important factor in the Smith and Swetland Cases. But such a
solution would obviously be too simple. If effective possession
really depends upon the use to which the surface is put, clearly the
adoption of a single rule for all cases would be arbitrary and
illogical. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that the primary
purpose of the altitude rules is not to limit the landowner's property rights in space, but to regulate flying itself in the interest
of the safety of both aviator and landowner.7
The second view is that indicated in the Hinman Case, and
perhaps impliedly approved by the Supreme Court by its denial of
certiorari. This view appears to make the landowner's rights in
the air space depend, not upon possible use of such space, but upon
actual use,7 and to eliminate any concept of technical trespass to
air space justifying the recovery of nominal damages. An aviator
would not be a trespasser unless his flying actually and substan77
See Kingsley and Maugham, The Correlative Interests of Landowner
and the Airman, (1932) 3 J. Air Law 374.
78
in the Smith Case, (1930) 270 Mass. 511, 170 N. E. 385, 393, the
Massachusetts court had said:
"The test suggested is not actual but possible effective possession...
In the Hinman Case, however, the court declared:
"It would be. and is, utterly impracticable and would lead to endless
confusion, if the law should uphold attempts of landowners to stake out, or
assert claims to definite, unused spaces in the air in order to protect
some contemplated future use of it. Such a rule, if adopted, would constitute a departure never before attempted by mankind, and utterly at
variance with the reason of the law. If such a rule were conceivable, how
will courts protect the various landowners in their varying claims of portions
of the sky?" (84 F. (2d) 758).
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tially injured the landowner in his present use and enjoyment of
the surface. The adoption of this view would certainly afford the
aviator complete freedom from the annoying implications of the
ad coelum maxim, and at the same time substantially protect the
right of the landowner. It is true that such a view would appear
to be in direct conflict with the long line of decided cases, heretofore considered, holding that any intrusions into the space above
one's land, at least near the surface, are to be regarded as trespasses even though no appreciable harm results from the intrusion. This, however, is not a real objection, since, while precedents
mean much in our system of jurisprudence, they are not so sacrosanct that they cannot yield to changed conditions. As one
judge has said

:79

"It is well enough to hang to our theories and ideas, but when
there is an effort to apply old principles to present-day conditions,
and they will not fit, then it becomes necessary for a readjustment,
and principles and facts as they exist in this age must be made
conformable."
Even more disrespectful of precedent is the third view, which
would give to the landowner no ownership or possessory interest
whatsoever in the space above his land.80 As under the view just
discussed, an entry into the air space would not constitute an
actionable wrong unless it causes some actual damage or apprehension of damage to the landowner; but the landowner's remedy
in such a case would be an action for a nuisance rather than an
action for a trespass. Immediately, the question arises whether
the landowner's interest would be adequately protected under this
theory. Generally speaking, a nuisance involves the idea of continuity or recurrence; an isolated act is not sufficient. 8' This being
the case, it may be doubted whether a landowner would be entitled to any redress for the single flight of an airplane over his
property if the view under discussion were adopted.
It is to be noted that this view is apparently based upon the
premise that the surface owner cannot in reality own the space
above his land as he owns the land itself-that he cannot seize,
79
Logan, J., in Edwards v. Sims, (1929) 232 Ky. 791, 24 S. W. (2d)
619, 622.
"Z,
SOThis view was indicated by Lord Ellenborough's famous dictum in
Pickering v. Rudd, supra note 21, to the effect that the firing of bullets in
vacuo over land and the flights of balloons would not be trespasses.
Apparently, this view has likewise been advanced by Salmond, Jurisprudence,

8th ed.; Baldwin, The Law of the Airship, (1910) 4 Am. J. Int. L. 95, 97;
Kuhn, The Beginnings of an Aerial Law, (1910) 4 Am. J. Int. L. 109, 123:
(1931)81 16 MINNESoTA LAv REviEw 318.
See 46 C. J. 679.
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handle, or deal with such space. It may be answered, however, that
one may not ordinarily handle land in a literal sense. Moreover,
the enjoyment of the surface of land is bound up with the right
to have it permanently and exclusively, and to prevent all others
from any use of it. In any event, both this view and the view
supported by the Hinman Case would appear to require a complete
reexamination of the whole principle of technical trespass to land,
a principle which has long been recognized in our law.
Finally, mention should be made of a theory which, while
not indorsed by the courts, appears to be the only theory as to
property rights in the air space which has gained recognition by
statute in this country. This view adopts the ad coelum maxim as
still controlling and, in accordance with the maxim, gives the
landowner title to the space above his land indefinitely upward,
except that aircraft are allowed to enjoy a legal right -of free
passage through such space. In support of this view, it has been
variously urged that the right of flight is only a modern form
of the ancient "right to make a journey" or "right of necessity ;-182
that it is a right analogous to the easement of public right of
navigation over navigable waters ;83 or that it is a right only now
created by the "evolution of society itself.1 84 At least one recent

writer argues that it was a "latent" easement which became
"patent" with the development of aviation.85
Whatever may be its rationale, this view has been incorporated
in the Uniform State Law for Aeronautics and in the American
Law Institute's Restatement of the Law of Torts. And it has
apparently been sanctioned by the Federal Air Commerce Act
of 1926.88
Section 3 of the Uniform State Law for Aeronautics, approved
by the American Bar Association in 1922, provides:
"The ownership of the space above the lands and waters of this
State is declared to be vested in the several owners of the surface
beneath, subject to the right of flight prescribed in Section 4."
82
Ballantyne, The Air-A Realm of Law, (1910) 22 Jurid. Rev.
16, 95.
83
MacCracken, Air Law, (1923) 57 Am. L. Rev. 97.
84

Williams, The Existence of the Right of Flight, (1931) 79 U. Pa.
L. Rev.
729, 741.
85
Harrison, Navigable Air Space and Property Rights, (1930) 1 J.

Air Law
346.
86

The Air Commerce Act of 1926, section 10, approved May 20, 1926
(44 Stat. at L. 574; 49 U. S. C. A. sec. 180, 3 Mason's U. S. Code, tit.
49, sec. 180) defines the term "navigable air space" as the air space above
the minimum space altitudes of flight prescribed by the secretary of com-

merce and provides that such "navigable air space shall be subject to a
public right of freedom on interstate and foreign air navigation" in conformity with the provisions of the act.
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Section 4 prescribes the "right of flight" as follows:
"Flight in aircraft over lands and waters of this State is lawful unless at such a low altitude as to interfere with the then existing use to which the land or water or the space over the land or
water, is put by the owner, or unless so conducted as to be imminently dangerous or damaging to persons or property lawfully
on the land or water beneath. ..."

At its twelfth annual meeting in 1934, the American Law Institute adopted its Restatement of Torts, and with respect to
ownership of the air space, the Restatement provides:
"Section 1002. A trespass actionable under the rules stated in
section 1001 may be committed on, beneath or above the surface
of the earth."
Then, after thus adopting a literal construction of the ad coelum
maxim, the Restatement, like the Uniform State Law, makes an
exception:
"Section 1038. An entry above the earth on the air space in
the possession of another by a person who is traveling in an aircraft, is privileged if the flight is conducted
(a) for the purpose of travel through the air space,
(b) in a reasonable manner, and
(c) at such a height as not to interfere unreasonably with the
possessor's enjoyment of the surface of the earth and the
air space above it."
Both the provisions of the Uniform State Law and those of the
Restatement of the Law of Torts have been adversely criticized
and made the subject of much controversy.87 In 1931, the Committee on Aeronautical Law of the American Bar Association, in
submitting a Uniform Aeronautical Code, omitted the provision
contained in the Uniform State Law with the declaration that "the
88
statement as to ownership of air space proclaims a legal untruth.1
It must be admitted, however, that the "right of flight" view
has the apparent advantage of reconciling the ad coelum maxim
with modem aircraft interests. The aviator need have no fear of
trespassing upon the space belonging to underlying landowners so
87

Zollman, State Control of Aeronautics in 1931, (1931) 3 J. Air
Law 71; (1934) 5 J. Air Law 455; Logan. Recent Developments in Aeronautical Law, (1934) 5 J. Air Law 548; Wherry and Condon, Aerial Trespass under the Restatement of the Law of Torts, (1935) 6 Air L. Rev.
113; Kingsley and Maugham. The Correlative Interests of the Landowner
and the Airman, (1932) 3 T. Air Law 374.
8856 A. B. A. Rep. 319. However, certain members of the association
objected to the omission of the provision of the Uniform Law on the
ground that the principle of property rights in the air space had become a
rule of property which could not be dislodged by legislative declaration.
Hayden, Objections to the New Uniform Aeronautical Code, (1932) 18
A. B. A. J. 121; Hayden. Air Space Property Rights under the New
Aeronautical Code, (1933) 4 Air L. Rev. 31.
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long as he is in the proper exercise of the right of passage; it is
only if he flies in the immediate proximity of the earth that he
runs the risk of becoming a trespasser. On the other hand, this
view not only lends support to the literal application of the ad
coelum maxim in defiance of recent court decisions, but it is subject to important practical objections. The introduction of the
concept of "privilege" is inaccurate, confusing, and inadequate. 9
Thus, under the Restatement, the privilege of flight would appear
'to exist only for purposes of travel, and would apparently not
extend to exhibition flying, test flying, racing, or scientific and
military operations in the air. 0 Moreover, the practical difficulty
of determining whether the so-called right of flight has been exercised in a "reasonable manner" in a particular case is obvious.
VI. CONCLUSION

The law of aviation is still relatively young; and it would perhaps be presumptuous to attempt to predict which view of space
ownership will ultimately prevail. One thing, however, seems evident. There is a fundamental conflict between the decided cases
and the theory adopted by the Restatement and the Uniform State
Law. The courts have definitely discarded a literal application of
the ad coelum maxim; and yet both the Restatement and the Uniform Law would preserve the maxim as a principle of law (which
it never has been), qualified only by the "right of flight." Until
this discrepancy between judicial opinion and legislative enactment is eliminated, the rights of aviator and landowner will almost
certainly continue to be a source of confusion.
Notwithstanding the great popularity of the "effective possession" view, it seems quite likely that the difficulties involved in its
application will eventually lead to its rejection. If it should be
adopted, then in the words of the court in the Hinman Case,91
"how will courts protect the various landowners in their varying
claims of portions of the sky?" Any landowner may easily assert a
claim to certain space above his land on the ground that he may
possibly need to occupy that space in connection with his use of
the surface. However, even if he succeeds in proving facts to
support such a tenuous claim, there remains the difficult question
8
9Wherry and Condon, Air Travel and Trespass, (1934) 68 U. S.
78.
L. Rev.
90
See Logan, Recent Developments in Aeronautical Law, (1934) 5 J.
Air Law 548. For further criticism of the "right of flight" view, see New-

man, Aviation and the Constitution, (1930) 39 Yale L. J. 1113, 1129.

91(C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1936) 84 F. (2d) 755, 758, cert. den. (1937) 57 Sup.
Ct. 431.
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of determining just how high his title to the space should extend.
And then, if the court should arbitrarily decide that his "property"
extends to a certain height, the landowner may never actually occupy or use the space. Consequently, the flight of airplanes over his
land might successfully be prevented within the judicially-established "zone of effective possession," even though he would suffer
no actual harm if they did enter that zone.
The theory underlying the Hinman Case - that there may
be no recovery without actual damage-appears to present a solution more satisfactory to all concerned, and certainly less fraught
with practical difficulties than either the "zone" theory or the
"right of flight" theory adopted by the Restatement and the Uniform State Law. The "zone" theory would apparently thrust
upon the landowner the burden of proving his effective possession
of the space entered by an airplane in a particular case; and the
"right of flight" theory would seem to make it incumbent upon
the airman to prove a proper exercise of his privilege . 2 In either
case, the burden of proof would be a burden in fact as well as in
name; for it would involve the introduction of legal concepts heretofore unknown to our law. On the other hand, the adoption of
the theory supported by the Hinman Case would mean simply that
the landowner would be required to show actual and substantial
injury-a matter considerably more susceptible of proof than "effective possession" or "privilege of flight."
Whether the action should be based upon the ground of trespass or upon the ground of nuisance does not appear to be vitally
important. Probably trespass would be most satisfactory in the
usual case, although, as previously noted, it would be a new sort
of trespass based, not on technical infringement of property
rights, but founded upon substantial injury.
In any event, it seems preeminently desirable that the ad coelum
maxim be entirely disregarded so far as the question of trespass to
air space by airplanes is concerned. Interpreted literally, the maxim
was never law. At best, it was applied by the courts only for the
purpose of protecting landowners against overhanging eaves, cornices, and similar permanent intrusions near the surface of the
land; and intrusions of that nature cannot reasonably be compared with the flight of airplanes. According to its historians,
the maxim began with a sepulchre. Surely the time has now arrived when it might appropriately end with another one-its own.
92

See (1937) 21

MINNESoTA

LAw RzvIEw 572, 585.

